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EGAL education is at low ebb in these hazardous days of national emergency. In a war for self-preservation, it is natural that every effort be strained to attain the vitally needed objectives. If the war were the sole cause for the lapse in prestige, legal
educators could mark time, patiently awaiting the return of their
students and the resumption of their tasks as in former times.
But there is more than mere suspicion that the present condition
is only the most aggravated symptom of the inadequacy of legal
education that has been keenly felt for more than a quarter of a
century. If the reader agrees as to the existence of the more serious defects in legal education described below, he should consider
the problems and the adoption of the proposed reforms here and
now; for there is every indication that in the post-war world these
problems and reforms will be even more urgent than they have
been at any time in the past.
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

Before one can fairly consider any important proposed change
in legal education, it is necessary that certain preliminary issues
be confronted squarely, and determined definitely. Most fundamental of these is the claim that legal education is seriously inadequate. This involves a consideration of the objectives of legal
education and of the work being done by law school graduates.
It involves, secondly, examination of what is perhaps the chief
argument in support of recommendations for sharp revision of
legal education, namely, that economic change has been so accelerated in recent years that lawyers are presented with basically new
problems which they are ill-prepared to solve. Intertwined with
the above are questions of more ultimate objectives and ideals.
If these are envisioned in terms of service rather than in terms of
personal emolument or other terms that refer solely to the practitioner, then - though these may not be mutually exclusive since
remuneration should bear a rational relationship to service- the
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difference in emphasis is sufficiently great to produce divergent
views regarding the aims, contents, methods, and results of present
legal education.
A major difficulty which complicates the achievement of a consensus of competent academic opinion is that some of the above
problems are packed with political issues. The law professor cannot, any more than any other citizen, keep from evaluating contemporary economic and political change. Like lawyers generally,
his judgment of collectivist trends is apt to be adverse. Quite
naturally he is led to suspect that some of the recently proposed
changes in legal education, especially those concerning integration
with the social sciences, are motivated by desires to support the
current economic reforms, or at least, involve tacit approval.
It is submitted that before any fair evaluation can be made of
proposed substantial curricular changes, some common ground
must be achieved with reference to the above issues. For such
proposed changes must rest on a conviction that present legal education is very inadequate, and on the related, subordinate positions
that the present-day law graduate faces a substantially different
future than his predecessor in the hey-day of the case system: so
many enter government service or business, or engage in types of
practice which are so different from traditional individual-client
representation, and even such client representation has changed
so markedly, as to require substantial reform of legal education
to provide the required general preliminary equipment. In brief,
we need to modify our conceptions of "lawyers' work" and, pro
tanto, of the general training necessary thereto.
In support of these premises, what can be said, which, if not
fully persuasive, will at least lead to a willingness to experiment
with suitable reforms? In the absence of substantial knowledge,
one can simply point to commonly-known facts established by
various studies and surveys: the known influx of graduates into

government services

(15-20%);

the rise of administrative boards

and practice; the large numbers who enter business, or join corporate organizations, not infrequently in only partially legal capacities. As to the fundamental cause, vast economic change, one may
point to the history and effects of the Industrial Revolution, and
to the legal as well as social science literature starting about the
eighteen-seventies, that reflect drastic upheavals in population
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movements and in working and living conditions generally. One
need hardly dwell upon the wars and revolutions of our own times,
nor upon the course of legislation and decision in this country,
at least since the beginning of this century, as cogent evidence of
major economic changes. It seems almost an inevitable inference
that the practice of law would feel the impact of such changes no
less than other social institutions.
It should not be difficult to reach a similar agreement concerning
alleged or suspected political and ideological motivation. For if
universities are in any sense worthy of their lofty affirmations, the
scholars who compose their faculties perform functions that rise
above partisanship. If truth-seeking differs from the pursuit of
economic interests, then it is difficult to understand how any educator can deliberately ignore the common facts or fail to try to
meet resulting needs - simply because as a citizen he does not
approve of what is going on. If the changes are evanescent, they
deserve little study; but if the contrary is true, they cannot be
simply and indefinitely ignored. In any event, no legal scholar
can completely withhold his criticism of legal proposals to solve
economic and other social problems. A curriculum which provided opportunity for such criticism would not imply, by any
stretch of the imagination, approval of current changes in law, decisions, or economic organization; nor, for that matter, would it
imply disapproval. It would simply bring within the reach of
competent criticism, legal problems that cry aloud for treatment
by qualified scholars.
There remains one final preliminary consideration. Granted
that lawyers' practices are in large degree substantially "different," that the differences and the problems result chiefly from
sweeping economic changes, and that the issues that inhere in the
current reforms, legislative and judicial, are a proper sphere for
dispassionate analysis by legal educators - granted all of this what evidence is there that traditional legal education does not
meet the present needs as well as possible? What evidence is there
of the alleged gross inadequacy of contemporary legal education?
The most obvious proof of this is the enormous volume of criticism that has filled legal periodicals since 1914, when Redlich
published his epochal criticism of the case-method of instruction.
Examine the Index to Legal Periodicalsand you will find a mount-
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ing flood of criticism and proposed reforms. Is this literature the
product of extremists, of" agitators," and of replies by " conservatives "? If that were so, the issues could still not be brushed aside
summarily since they at least merited the study and response of
many well-recognized scholars and lawyers. But that is assuredly
not the case. The periodicals contain constructive but nonetheless sweeping criticisms by distinguished scholars and lawyers of
all political hues, including some known for their traditional "liberalism" or "conservatism." 1 For example, in light of the substantial number of law graduates who enter government service, it
is important to know of their qualifications for such work. The
adverse judgments of a number of competent observers could be
cited; of these, perhaps the best informed, and certainly one of the
most moderate of critics, is Dr. Leonard D. White, who writes:
It must be said that the training of the lawyer, based on precedent, and
looking backward rather than forward for guidance, is not a training
which is suited to make the ideal administrator ....

Our legal educa-

tion has not given emphasis to the proper preparation of lawyers for the
public service; indeed, there is a strong sentiment among some law faculties that no special preparation is needed or useful. This view cannot
be accepted in the light of modern conditions. .. 2
It would be possible to marshal considerable like criticism of many
judges and lawyers in public office, e.g., criminologists commonly
criticize their qualifications to discharge penological functions.
But what of the "general practitioner," for whom we are primarily
concerned? Recent surveys suggest much regarding changed
practice: the rise of administrative law is only one of many new
conditions that call for additional equipment and the preliminary
training necessary thereto. One could cite considerable respectable authority in support of this view. Perhaps the Presidential
Address of Elihu Root before the American Bar Association as
long ago as 1916 is as persuasive as any of the numerous emphases
on the needs of the Bar, and especially the need "to reach the
lawyer in the making and mold his habits of thought by adequate
instruction and training so that when he comes to the Bar he will
1 See, e.g., Gilmore, Presidential Address to the American Association of Law
Schools (1920) 7 A. B. A. J. 227, 229, and especially his quotations from numerous
distinguished scholars and lawyers.
2 WmmrT, GovERN.3aNT CARE.R SERVICE (1935) 46-47.
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have learned to think not merely in terms of law but in terms of
jurisprudence." 3
Finally, we have had the actual example, during the past fifteen
years, of numerous important changes in law curricula - some of
them going to the point of providing four-year law school courses.
These changes are the tacit, but perhaps also the most eloquent,
testimony that careful scholars, after persistent study, concluded
that traditional legal education is seriously inadequate to meet
the present needs of the profession and of the public that patronizes it as the monopoly of legal services.
SOME MAJOR DEFECTS OF LAW-SCHOOL CURRICULA

Every criticism of existing legal education rests upon a judgment that the objectives that ought and can be fulfilled are only
partially and inadequately realized. The objectives of legal education are logical inferences from the functions of the legal profession and these, in turn, refer to the role of law in society. These
more ultimate aims may be stated in terms of various ideals,
namely, maintaining order, securing life and property, dispensing
justice, and the like. We need not elaborate these basic goals although they cannot be ignored without repercussion upon, and
cost to, the profession.
The criticism of present law curricula in terms of the more immediate objectives - may be divided into two general types: one
focuses on the more or less traditional tasks of lawyers, and contends that there is much room for improvement. The other centers on the new functions, the "new lawyer," and stresses the inadequacy of legal education to provide the general preliminary
training required by such a practitioner. It is the position of this
writer that there is considerable merit in both types of criticism.
In the last twenty years, there has been a great rise in public
law, and numerous courses, chiefly in this field and, also, in juris355, 366.
4 Dean Pound has suggested that they are the supply of: (i) good trial lawyers;
(2) good advocates before appellate courts; (3)good office lawyers, including advisers to businessmen, property lawyers, advisers to trust companies, and commercial
adjusters; (4) judges and legislators; (5)lawyers competent to lead in pressing
necessary reforms and advisers on the legal aspects of public questions; (6) competent law teachers. Pound, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education (I933)
7 Am. L. SCROOL REv. 887-94.
3 (1916) 4I A. B. A. REP.
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prudence, legal history, and legislation, have been added to law
school curricula. Since the time factor has remained constant, the
result has been a crowding of the curriculum to the point where
no student can take all of the work offered - and in some of the
leading schools these very courses in public law are the ones
omitted despite their acknowledged importance. Furthermore,
the result has been not only crowding but confusion, for both student and faculty. The student, being the more narrow utilitarian,
consults the bar examination announcement and selects the "required" courses. Accordingly, despite the fact that in recent
years many schools have included courses designed to broaden
legal training, these remain largely window-dressing in the catalogues. Thus not only are the moderate advances rendered impotent but the bar examination looms up as a serious handicap to
sound legal education.
Consequently one major need is for organization of existing
curricula - not merely either the condensation of existing courses
or the addition of short lecture courses in lieu of full courses for existing law curricula are spontaneous, if not accidental, results
of various revealed needs. Chronological examination of the catalogues of any of the older law schools demonstrates concretely that
course has been piled upon course, exhibiting accretion and expansion rather than a thoroughgoing analysis of the entire curriculum. Failure to organize the curriculum may be but one phase of
the modern movement disparaging logical analysis and traditional
legal methods. It may be due to emphasis on the second type of
criticism to be considered shortly. It may be due to specialization
aggravated by the fact that only rarely have legal educators as
groups attacked their problems over substantial periods of time;
we have been individualists and, being specialists, this has meant
improvement within our own specialties. Unfortunately, it has
also led to serious neglect of the curriculum as a whole. With all
the current stress on integration, it is amazing to note the almost
total neglect of it within this area of greatest competence. That
Contracts, for example, is closely connected with Sales, Negotiable
Instruments, and Insurance is apparent. That the relationships
between Torts and Criminal Law are numerous and intimate has
been known at least since Terry's Anglo-American Law and
Beale's pioneering on Liability. It is highly probable that the
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various commercial courses cover much common ground and that
this is similarly characteristic of public law courses. An intimate
collaboration between the various legal specialists in related fields
is required, not only to eliminate repetition and unimportant detail, but also to construct an organized body of materials throughout the traditional curriculum. In that endeavor we should free
ourselves of the obsession that the student must be drilled on
every detailed variation of every rule of law that he may conceivably encounter in practice. That sort of instruction is a law school
version of mere accumulation of information. Organization of
the curriculum alone cannot be expected to meet the present
needs; it is one essential step, however, and it has special significance for the 2-2-2 Plan to be described. The resulting condensation would make room for the newer courses,5 giving students a
comprehensive view of the whole corpus juris.6 Furthermore, it
would make possible the attainment of other objectives presently
lacking in our typical curriculum, e.g., training in draftsmanship,
brief-writing, and legal research.
The more debatable issues concern the second type of criticism
of legal curricula, which emphasizes integration of law and social
science. From this perspective, what is wrong with legal education? No effort will be made here to state the position of the various proponents of this view,' since these are diverse, and it is apparent that they have rather generally failed to convince. The
reasons for such failure are not difficult to apprehend. The integration of law and social science is relatively new. The theoretical
bases for such integration have not yet been made explicit and
clear. There are very few substantial contributions to exemplify
what the integrators are advocating. The abundant literature
advocating integration proceeds on a rather crude level of specific
example, illuminated occasionally by remarkably fine insight.
But the chief arguments put forth are clear. They stress: the
inadequacy of present legal education in providing necessary
training for judges, legislators, government employees, and many
5 See Dickinson, Legal Education and the Law-School Curriculum (i93i) 79

U.

or PA. L. REv. 424.
6

See Vanderbilt, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education (I933) 7 Am. L.

SCHOOL REv. 902, 907.
7 The pioneering study

is the Su'm-iAR

FACULTY OF LAw OF COumBIA UNIVERsiT

OF

STuilEs

(1928).

IN LEcGAL EDUCATION BY THE
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private practitioners; the need for the study of law as a science
rather than exclusively as a technology; the need for the study
of law in relation to social requirements and problems; a functional study and understanding rather than a predominantly
analytical study; the necessity for broadening the study of law by
integrating it with the social sciences. The integration of law and
social science is the foundation stone of this type of criticism.
The opposition to such reform has been vigorous, and we must
consider some of the reasons for this.
It must be noted that in the past there has been deep suspicion
on the part of many highly competent legal educators that, as they
sometimes put it: The social so-called "sciences " are not only
not science, they are not even well-ordered disciplines. They are,
at best, common sense descriptions of fact; at worst, a hodgepodge of confusion and propaganda. Why substitute them for a
training that has a tradition of centuries, that is rigorous, that
disciplines and is directly useful?
What must be recognized and emphasized is that this older and
unqualified criticism has largely disappeared. It is not that the
weaknesses and the difficulties of social science are forgotten, but
that its importance, particularly in an era of tragic social tensions,
is now widely conceded. The most cogent evidence of this newer
attitude among legal educators was provided by the new Harvard
and Minnesota curricula. Read in the light of Professor Simpson's remarks 8 and Dean Fraser's report,' this means that the
highest level of knowledge in social science is now regarded as an
essential part of the required equipment, but that it had best be
studied after considerable training in law. The implications for
legal education which ignores such knowledge are plain. The present major problem is - how can these disciplines best be utilized
to improve legal education?
The argument most commonly heard from critics of integration
of law and social science in the law school curriculum may be
stated briefly as follows: The teaching of social science is the job
of the colleges; let the student get it there, and let him get it before
he enters the law school. There is little enough time as is to teach

8

HANmoox oF Ass'N or Am. L. ScHooLs (1939) 120-21.

9 REPORT OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNVsrrY oF AMNESOTA (1938-40).
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the law that the graduate needs to know. Finally, the attempt by
the law school to do both jobs will damage present standards.
This criticism reaches the point of sharp opposition when it is
realized that some of the reformers entertain philosophies that discount the value of law, and training in law. It must also be admitted that it is gross exaggeration to assert that law schools study
only rules of law, since every case includes a statement of facts.
In addition, the student brings some twenty years of living, observing, and learning with him into the classroom; this is supplemented by information presented by the professor. But, as noted,
it has been very widely recognized during recent years that attainment of the newer objectives requires much greater knowledge
than is provided by merely the legally relevant facts, amplified by
fragmentary additional information. Recognition that knowledge
of the social sciences, including the humanities and business disciplines, and of their methods of investigation is indispensable implies that sustained efforts are required to provide the additional
necessary equipment.
The most persuasive single item of proof that the advocates of
integration" have failed to make their programs understood is
the common insistence that the college impart social science prior to
entrance into law school, and that the law school continue to teach
only "law." The very form in which this objection is phrased
reveals the almost complete lack of understanding of the problems
of integration. This is hardly a culpable failing since the proponents of educational reforms, if they have entertained any definite theories of integration, have been reticent to expound them.
At the same time, in fairness to the proponents of integration, it
must be recognized that the advocates of a substantially new legal
education are naturally enthusiastic to remedy keenly-felt needs,
and consequently they are apt to forget that integration raises most
difficult problems of theory and execution.
The simplest ground for opposing the continued rigorous total
separation between teaching social science and teaching law is that
law cannot be adequately understood unless it is studied directly
and immediately in relation to the major social problems that confront individuals and groups, and produce the conflicts dealt with
by law. This is not the revelation of a new legal philosophy; it is
wisdom as old as Aristotle, and the grounds have been attractively
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restated in Professor Whitehead's popular article on the need for
relating fact to concept and theory, and of studying both in their
various significant interrelations."0 It is in this sense that thoughtful scholars and officials have urged the "broadening of the study
of law." Had the movement for reform not been impeded by adventitious and unsound detours, it is probable that it would have
made much greater progress than it has, since, essentially, it follows in the tradition of teaching legal history and social policy il
the law schools. The present stress on integration is founded on
the premise that such teaching must be much more thorough and
systematic than in the past.
Accordingly, this much must be insisted upon at this point: if
social science must be integrated with law in order that law be
more fully understood and the present-day needs of practice met,
the task cannot be entrusted solely to the college. For law and
legal problems constitute the focus of legal education. These
provide not only the central problems for study, but they also
initiate and direct the acquisition of nonlegal knowledge. But
the integration of law and social science is tremendously difficult even for legal scholars who have studied the problem for years.
Such integration remains largely in the realm of art and cultivated insight. No theory for the unification of diverse fields of
learning has won general acceptance. Indeed, it is not unlikely
that "unification" in any scientific sense is theoretically impossible - although we can and do have intelligent juxtaposition of
significant knowledge from various fields. The several disciplines
not only have distinctive terminologies- which alone might be
mediated -but in addition, they deal with problems formulated
on levels which are appropriate to their particular objectives and
supply descriptions and theories relevant to their special inquiries.
The employment of legal rules and theories to amplify social science is almost as feasible as the converse. Something of both
must be done in the modern law school, but it will be generally
agreed that the major undertaking will continue to be rooted, orientated, and directed from legal problems and law. This is sim10 Harvard: The Future (1936) 158 ATm. MONTHLY 260. Cf. Llewenyn, On
What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 651;
Lewis, The Social Sciences as the Basis of Legal Education (1913) 61 U. o" PA. L.
REV. 531.
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ply to assert that the law school will continue to be interested
chiefly in law as technology, practical knowledge. But it is coming to be equally recognized that the extent of its success in discharging this task will depend more and more on its utilization
of the social sciences and their methods to illuminate the law, its
rules, doctrines, procedures, and practices. On that premise the
conclusions are inescapable that the law school cannot insist on
complete and rigorous separation of the teaching of law and social
science, and that it cannot impose an impossible obligation on
the college or graduate school. Nor will any legal scholar who
has struggled with the enormously difficult problems of integrating law and social science be apt to imagine that even his best
students will be able to accomplish that by themselves through
some sort of spontaneous incorporation into the law courses of the
social science acquired as undergraduates. It is the law school's
job and must be confronted and dealt with as such.

FouR-YEA CURRICULA

AS MAJOR RESPONSES TO THE NEEDS

The natural, initial adaptation to the two aforementioned major
types of criticism has been the advocacy of, and the adoption by,
several schools of a four-year curriculum. The relevant literature
is extensive and the reader's familiarity with it is assumed.11 We
do need to recall, however, that advocacy of a four-year law curriculum goes back at least twenty years, that its advocates include
such distinguished scholars as Beale and Wigmore, and that several first-rate law schools have embarked upon such programs.
Although sufficient time has hardly elapsed for thorough studies
of the results, it is possible to consider certain of the problems and
difficulties involved. The overriding single fact has been the unwillingness of the vast majority of law schools to adopt a fouryear law program. There are several reasons for this. There is
the general reluctance to add a year to the total schooling of the
law graduate. This unwillingness may be unsound but it is an attitude that can hardly be ignored. For those schools which require a college degree for entrance (a large proportion of these
11 For convenient description, see Harsch, The Four-Year Law Course in Ameri242; HANDBOOx Ass'N or Am. L. ScHooLs
(1939) 100, 177.

can Universities (i939) 17 N. C. L. REv.
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permit their own college students to enter with three years) it
would seem a simple matter to substitute a 3-4 plan, since no increase in the total time would result.12 Generally, the better law
schools require three years of college work as a prerequisite, with
six years for the combined courses. Since a large number of these
schools' entering law students are college graduates, it would not
appear to be very difficult for these schools to adopt a 3-4 program, though here an additional year is involved.
In view of the prevailing distaste to add a year to the student's
time in education, the law schools which have adopted a four-year
program (except Washington) have met the situation by reducing
the entrance requirements by one year: the 2-4 plan is presently
the most frequent adaptation to the commonly recognized needs.
As noted, this plan has not met with wide approval - at least if
adoption is the test. Criticism centers on the pre-legal education
since many legal scholars join their colleagues in the colleges in
believing that two years is inadequate preparation for study of
law. It must be noted and remembered, moreover, that this opinion is supplemented by the view that the four-year law curricula
have not been worked out sufficiently well to overbalance the cutting-down of the pre-legal training. As to the former position, it
must be conceded that we simply lack the knowledge for precise
or objective judgment. It is debatable whether two, three, or four
years of college is best. That, however, is not the problem. If
that were the issue, there would usually be only one answer - the
more the better; and by like standards, it could be argued that
12 The writer is not unaware of the practical difficulties resulting from the tradition, especially in the east, of graduation from a four-year college prior to entering
law school. That law school education should be permanently handicapped by
treating the consequent restrictions as unalterable is inconceivable. In the east, a
uniform policy by the leading law schools would go very far to solve this problem.
The advantage there lies in the small number of these law schools. In the midwest
and elsewhere, a similar advantage results from the dominance of the universities in
college education and the frequency of admission into law school with less than a
college degree. Cf. Bordwell, Ezperimentation and Continuity in Legal Education
(1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 3z6, 3,7. It should not be impossible to secure the further
cooperation of the various colleges concerned to the point of encouraging their
students to enter law school after completion of one year less of college work if the
new program in its entirety provides a better liberal education than is presently
available. Certainly it should not be assumed that college administrators will oppose arrangements that would provide a better education for their relatively few
students who plan to study law.
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four years of law training is better than three or two. Clearly
judgment must be made on the whole education and must focus
constantly on the wisest allocationof the given time. It is natural
for college educators to stress the value of college education and
to minimize the worth of what they call technical training. The
major difficulty here is that the content of the four-year curricula
has not been clarified to associates in the colleges. The importance of this may not be appreciated by most law professors, but it
will be grasped immediately by those who have served on committees that have discussed four-year law programs with members of
the college faculty -especially with reference to granting of appropriate degrees. As long as the college deans and faculties believe that anything taught in the law school is "vocational," there
will be strong opposition to every attempt to curtail the time devoted to sound liberal education by the colleges; this obstructs the
adoption of 2-4 curricula. Again, the simplest, if not the wisest,
method of meeting such opposition has been for the law school to
set its own admission requirements, to grant all degrees itself, to
go its own way.
This focuses attention on the four-year curriculum itself rather
than on the pre-legal training, and raises more difficult questions.
What assurance is there that it gets better results than the threeyear curriculum? This depends on the answers to various subordinate inquiries which must be examined. It has been argued
most effectively, for example, that up to the present time the most
that legal educators can claim is that they have developed a very
good program for the first two years of law school. In the opinion
of many, the third year is grossly inadequate.13 In light of this
major failure in the traditional three-year curriculum, it seems
hardly feasible at the present time to add one more year of the
same kind of work. On the other hand, if the introduction of
social science is the chief basis for lengthening the law curriculum,
it must be recognized that it has not been established that such
integration requires more time; perhaps less time is needed if the
student is given the additional insight at apt places in his law
courses.
'3 See Beale, Aims and Methods of Legal Education (i93i) 7 AM. L. SCHOOL
R!V. 145-47; Mechem, Remarks in HANDBOOK or Ass'x oF Am. L. ScooLs (1939)
X12.
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But existing four-year curricula give rise to much more serious
doubts. The introduction of social science courses throughout the
law curriculum at this time is likely to produce a confusion in subject matter that would magnify the present disorganization considerably. Certainly no school has succeeded thus far in introducing social science courses into the law curriculum or even social
science into many law courses, and in organizing the total into an
intelligible and rational whole.
The facts must be faced fairly. The most important one is that
integration of law and social science is tremendously difficult.
Furthermore, integration is a matter of years of cultivation, and
the majority of law teachers, for no censurable reason whatever,
have little specialized knowledge of the social sciences, even when
they recognize the need and are sympathetic with the efforts in that
direction by some of their associates. Is it not significant in this
regard that even these colleagues are still in the state of cautiously
introducing fragments of social science into their courses, and that
they have hardly yet begun the enormous task of planning a complete law curriculum in these terms, much less actually providing
all of the necessary materials? Under these conditions, and in
light of the needs and objectives mentioned above, what is the best
that can be done here and now?
THE PROPOSED 2-2-2 PLAN
The 2-2-2 Plan (for those who devote seven years to the whole
program, or who think that seven years is the most desirable time,
3-2-2 should hereafter be substituted) was formulated and presented to his colleagues by the writer over a year ago. It provides
for two years of pre-legal work; two years of "straight law"
work; and two years of law and college work to be carried on simultaneously. The first division requires little discussion except
to note that, if seven years are or become available, then three
years rather than two should be spent on pre-law work, not so
much because the additional pre-legal year has been demonstrated
to be important for sound law study as because the resulting program of studies is thereby simplified and rendered more effective.
The 2-2-2 Plan requires that the first two of the last four years
be spent largely as at present, namely, devoted to "law"s subjects.
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With reference to the usual three-year law curriculum, this leaves
one year of law to be completed; with reference to the usual three
year pre-law curriculum, there also remains one year. The 2-2-2
Plan provides that for each of the last two years of the student's
training, he carry approximately one-half a year's work in law
simultaneously with one-half a year's work in college subjects. In
further description of the 2-2-2 Plan it must be stated:
(i) There is no agreement concerning the content of the prelaw work except that there appears to be considerable emphasis on
sound liberal education, and a reluctance by law teachers to rely
on the social sciences to attain this end. There does appear, however, to be some fair agreement that the pre-law work should emphasize composition and oral expression, history, especially English and American constitutional history, mathematics or logic,
and physical science. Electives could be in any recognized field
including business courses, social science, and the humanities.
But, as noted, there is an increasing opinion among law teachers
that, for the most part, social sciences should be studied by law
students after considerable legal training, not before. Furthermore, the division of college work into Junior and Senior (two years
devoted to each), and the recent developments at Chicago imply
that considerable progress can be made towards providing a sound
general education in two years, especially if college entrance requirements are high. The writer hastens to add, to remove many
doubts presently held regarding two years of pre-law work, that
under the 2-2-2 Plan an entire year would later be devoted largely
to social science. Moreover, as will appear, the 2-2-2 Plan could
provide the finest liberal education ever offered.
(2)
The second division of the 2-2-2 Plan has been described
as devoted substantially to the present first and second years of
the traditional law curriculum for purposes of orientating the
reader. It is necessary now to add a number of qualifications.
First, it must be recognized that important changes have already
been made in the law curricula of leading schools. These changes,
including courses in Legal History, Introduction to Law, Jurisprudence, and Legislation, have been well received, and there is every
reason to continue them. Second, individual teachers here and
there have already succeeded in effectively introducing social science materials into their courses. This movement should be con-
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tinued and others should be encouraged to develop their courses
likewise, wherever feasible. But in the main, the first two years
in American law schools remain surprisingly uniform throughout
the country - a matter for much gratification, indeed. The chief
objectives during the first year are the imparting of basic legal
principles and the logic of legal methods, whereas the secondyear objectives are the concentrated learning of a very broad
field of law, with methods subordinated, and ability to use the
library assumed. These two years represent the peak achievement of American legal education to date, and it is important to
preserve the progress in methods of instruction which our law
schools are generally recognized to have contributed to education.
But if the aforementioned remarks concerning the present crowding of the curriculum and disorganization of subject matter are
valid, the problem and the challenge as regards the first two years
of law study are clearly indicated. Since one-third of the law
course is to be taken during the last two years under the 2-2-2
Plan, it is clear that this fact will need careful study when the work
presently given during the first two years is re-examined. But
the perfecting of the first two years of the law curriculum can be
directed very largely by traditional and well-known methods of
analysis. The task for improvement of these two years is clearly
defined.
(3) Much more debatable questions concern the last two years
of the 2-2-2 Plan. Here, as in each phase of the program, it is essential to bear in mind that the plan is intended for immediate
adoption. Accordingly, rigorous separation of each of the above
divisions of the Plan which might otherwise be arbitrary may be
defended as reasonable and necessary in light of this purpose. The
simplest initial program for these last two years consists in pairing
each law course with a factually relevant course in the college.
For example, Corporation Law may be paired with Corporate
Financing, Labor Law with Labor Economics, Taxation with Economics of Taxation, Administrative Law with Administration, Evidence with Psychology, Trusts with Investment Banking, Criminal
Procedure or Administration with Criminology, Jurisprudence
with Philosophy or Social Theory, Trade Regulation with the Economics of Competition and Monopoly, Procedure with Logic,
Constitutional Law with Political Theory or Advanced Constitu-
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tional History.1 4 These courses would continue to be taught separately and by the present personnel, but there would be the following important differences, in addition to the juxtaposition in time.
The college or graduate courses would be selected by the law
school; presumably one consideration would be a preference for
professors in the colleges and graduate schools who had had some
legal training, were interested in law, or had particularly important contributions to make to social theory or to their specialties.
Only a small number of such colleagues would be thus enlisted, and
in most universities they are available, though their talents for the
indicated contribution have been largely overlooked by the law
schools. As far as possible, the nonlegal courses chosen would be
given on a graduate level, indeed, where feasible, by a graduate
faculty. In addition, it would be a very simple matter to provide
134The writer trusts that it is quite clear that the above does not purport to be
a curriculum. The purpose has been to develop a method to be used in constructing
the new curriculum and merely to suggest what some of its contents might be. The
construction of a curriculum, ready for actual operation, would require some months
of careful study and consultation. There would be numerous problems to consider:
just what law courses should be given in the last two years, the matter of electives,
the fact that certain courses could not readily be paired with a nonlegal discipline,
and so on.
From a purely theoretical viewpoint, every law course could be improved by
increased knowledge of relevant facts and social theories. But the problem viewed
practically is by no means so boundless. For if the method of constructing the new
curriculum described above is valid, this decision (as to which courses should be
allocated to the last two years and integrated) would be largely determined by the
content of the present first two years of the curriculum. Modifications would be
suggested by various factors, e.g., problems of organization of the first two years'
work, the subject matter of the law courses - especially the existence of closely related courses in the college, and the law professors' own interest in integration -a
matter of very great importance, indeed. Again, with reference to the job of constructing the curriculum, the writer's initial thought is that jurisprudence, Conflicts,
and Advanced Procedure should be given in the last two years without being paired
with a social discipline. As to jurisprudence, because Philosophy and Social Theory
are already integrated in it; as to Advanced Procedure, because the necessary Logic
could very easily and preferably be integrated in the first-year course; as to Confficts,
because no nonlegal discipline readily suggests itself. In any event the indicated gaps
could be taken up by allocating two nonlegal disciplines to parallel certain law subjects - which would allow some degree of specialization (e.g., with Taxation might
go the Economics of Taxation and Accounting).
A final suggestion with reference to the construction of the last two years of the
2-2-2 curriculum is that some of the accompanying courses in nonlegal disciplines,
but by no means all, should be given in classes composed entirely of the law students. In that event the college professor might be especially encouraged to reorganize his own course so as to correlate it with the accompanying law course.
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for frequent consultation between the law and college professors
who give related courses, and for a regular meeting of both groups
-the law and college professors who teach the last two years of
the 2-2-2 program. Further, one member of each group might
well form a steering committee of the entire two years' work; their
special functions would be to consult with their respective colleagues and present jointly one or two courses on Methods that
would parallel and relate to the entire two years' work. It is likely
that as time went on, both sets of courses could be developed so
as to allow easy reference back and forth by both groups. Finally,
provision could be made for research and thesis work under joint
supervision. 5
Any evaluation of the 2-2-2 program must have one eye on objectives, both traditional and new, and the other on other curricula
now proposed or in operation. The proposed Plan would implement the traditional objectives. Since the first two years of the law
curriculum are left relatively unchanged except for the all-important improvements in organization of the materials, the gain in that
direction is evident. And since the work presently given in the
third year would continue to include the study of the same major
legal problems, it is probable that traditional analysis of these
problems would be considerably improved as the accompanying
nonlegal courses shed light on the relevant fact situations and social issues. It is reasonable to expect, also, that there would be
substantial savings in time, effected by careful synthesis, which
would give opportunity for work in brief-writing and draftsmanship.
Will the 2-2-2 Plan facilitate attainment of the newer objectives? Obviously this question is more debatable, especially since
it depends very much on administration of the program and on
numerous other more or less intangible factors; but a number of
pertinent observations may be hazarded. Admittedly, the ideal of
single integrated courses covering both law and social discipline is
not provided; but there are several considerations to be weighed
in this connection before final judgment is passed. There is the
15 Under the 2-2-2 Plan, a B.S. in Law could be given at the end of four years,
or, if preferred, both the A.B. and the LL.B. could be granted at the end of the six
years. Where seven years are available and the program is 3-2-2, the A.B. could be
given at the end of the first year of law study.
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paramount need to tackle the problem in a simple manner and by
methods that lead clearly to the new objectives without sacrificing
existing assets. Although the law professor who is equipped with
a specialized knowledge of even one social science is exceptional
indeed, even such a professor, it may be suggested, will be stimulated, informed, and otherwise assisted by competent scholars in
the colleges and graduate schools. If those scholars are carefully
selected as suggested above, they have much to offer. Indeed, it
would be difficult to exaggerate the potential contributions of such
scholars to law and legal education. To develop such a body of
lay critics would be a valuable achievement in itself.
There would be practical as well as theoretical advantages in
such collaboration. The political scientists are familiar with government work and they know both the opportunities and the required qualifications. The sociologists are similarly familiar with
the public welfare, including the penological, field; the economists
are familiar with needs and developments in business. The assistance of these scholars is presently available- but largely only
in theory! It would make a substantial difference if they were
made partly responsible for the training - if they actually participated in the education.
The hearty collaboration of the college and especially of the
graduate faculty would be assured because they would have an
additional direct and immediate interest in the last two years of
such a program, namely its utilization by their students in the social sciences, especially graduates, who either require certain technical legal knowledge or who wish to supplement their knowledge
of government, economics, or sociology by well-elaborated examples of institutional processes, or by amplification of theory itself
as provided by the teachers of law. There is little need to develop
this suggestion here. But it should be noted that college and
graduate faculties have become increasingly aware of the importance of law in an era of expanding governmental control, and that
if certain legal subjects could be presented so as to be comprehensible by nonprofessional students, there would be considerable interest in that aspect of the law school's work. The classroom association of law students with graduate students of social science,
especially in economics and social theory, offers additional important possibilities of improving the education of both groups.
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In relation to attainment of the newer objectives via integration,
the merits of the 2-2-2 Plan may be ascertained by comparison
with existing programs that seek similar objectives. Although the
latest Harvard catalogue includes a program, limited to students
in Harvard College, which appears to be similar in important regards to the 2-2-2 Plan, the description is necessarily very brief.
Apparently it has not yet been put into operation, and the official
article, describing the new Harvard curriculum in detail, makes no
mention of it." The two schools which have been teaching fouryear law curricula designed to utilize the nonlegal disciplines are
Chicago and Minnesota. Some detailed comment is required as to
these.
The Chicago plan introduces nonlegal courses from the very
beginning of the law curriculum. There are both practical and
theoretical grounds to question the validity of this method. The
major difficulty is that no law faculty is presently equipped to do
the entire job of integrating law and social science throughout the
curriculum, introduce complete courses in social science at various
points, and organize all of ihis into a rational whole. Such systematization has not yet been achieved even with the traditional subjects and materials, and the inclusion of social sciences throughout
the law curriculum under such circumstances can only increase
the existing disorganization. And organization is not merely a
logical or aesthetic desideratum. Its absence indicates a failure
to think through the curriculum as a whole; it means duplication, confusion, and unwise allocation of time and effort. Secondly, the prevailing 3-3 program, as well as the proposed 2-2-2
Plan, preserves the undiminished rigor of the first two years of
law study. (Whereas the prevalent 3-3 curricula include a deadly
and demoralizing third year during which the student marks time
awaiting the bar examination, the 2-2-2 Plan moves on to the new
objectives.) The Chicago plan clearly threatens this continuity
of rigorous legal education in the first two years of the traditional
curriculum. But even more, under the Chicago plan it is impossible for the student to produce as good results in his study of
the social sciences- at least during the first two years in law
51 HARV.
16 Simpson, The New Curriculum of the Harvard Law School (1938)
L. REv. 965. This does state: "It is hoped . .. that joint seminars with other
parts of the University may be developed." Id. at 979.
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school. The proposed 2-2-2 Plan places the social sciences after
considerable training in law. It would provide a more mature
student

-

indeed, one who is substantially a lawyer -who

could

work in the social sciences on a graduate level. The student who
has had two years of law work knows what to look for in the social
disciplines. He is equipped with a body of theory, a knowledge
of legal principles and doctrines, and considerable insight into
their rationale. He is able to take the next step by formulating
pertinent problems and evaluating the social science data and
theories critically - although he is by no means self-sufficient in
this regard. This, in the writer's opinion, has been the typical
evolution of legal scholars who have contributed important studies in the integrated law-social science field.
If it be argued in behalf of the Chicago plan, that the 2-2-2 program would set out too late to integrate law with the social sciences, one may answer that the Plan sets out to do that as soon
as feasible under existing limitations of time and theoretical
knowledge. In addition, as noted, the 2-2-2 Plan does not render
integration completely impossible during the first two years in law
school. On the contrary, if, for example, the professor of Contracts, Criminal Law, or Agency has already succeeded partially
in that direction or wishes to attempt it, he should be strongly encouraged. But there is a difference between using fragmentary
empirical data at appropriate places, together with brief summaries of relevant social theory, and the insertion of complete
courses in the social sciences. The former method increases the
insight of the law student but does not injure the organization of
the law courses, or their traditional analysis. The Chicago plan
raises special difficulties because the haphazard insertion of full
courses in social science from the very beginning imposes the unfortunate alternative, in teaching the law subjects, of either ignoring the accompanying social science courses, or disrupting the continuity and cohesion of the early law courses by dealing with them.
Finally the Chicago plan decreases the amount of social science
which could be introduced at the most desirable place - the last
two years - as well as consequent intensification of the work in
integration which could be possible there if the first two years
of that curriculum were confined to law courses. The total time
devoted to social science may be as much or more than that pos-
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sible under the 2-2-2 Plan, but the latter concentrates this work,
and does so at the most appropriate time.
Perhaps it will also be argued that a direct attack upon the entire front will achieve the commonly desired objectives more
quickly than the narrower approach of the 2-2-2 Plan. This,
however, may be doubted even if we ignore the inevitable neglect
of the student during the interim in which the law faculty is being
informed. There is no assurance whatever that we can get further
by proceeding in all directions simultaneously than we can by
concentrated attack on strategic points carried on under a clearly
formulated plan. It seems preferable to proceed from known positions and to build thereon. We are familiar with the legal materials and should be able to improve them progressively over a
period of time. We do not know-that it is desirable to introduce
nonlegal materials into every course or even into many of them,
nor how best to organize a curriculum composed of law and social
science courses throughout.
The proposed 2-2-2 Plan is closer to the Minnesota curriculum in
certain respects. Under both, social science is taken after considerable study of law. The basic defect in the Minnesota program, if
the writer's impressions are accurate, is that the four-year curriculum has become almost exclusively devoted to the study of law.
Integration with social science seems to have been drastically subordinated. The writer hazards the opinion that this happened
chiefly because there were no well-formulated methods of collaboration between the law and college faculties, or that they were
not actually put into operation. The students were apparently left
free to elect courses in the college or not. But if they did so
elect, they were on their own so far as integration with law was
concerned. Under such conditions of election and in light of the
basic defect noted, the students have preferred to take additional
law courses. Accordingly, Minnesota seems to have reached
about the same position as that taken initially by the University
of Washington (Seattle), which provides for four years of law
studies (neither Legal History nor Jurisprudence is included at
Washington!) except that at the latter school, three, instead of
two. years of pre-law training are required. Finally to be noted
is the proposal that integration of law and social science be confined to a post-graduate course. This has much merit; the pres-
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ently all-defeating difficulty is that only an insignificant number
of law school graduates enroll for graduate work.
CONCLUSION

Obviously there is nothing sacrosanct about

2-2-2,

no more than

about 3-3, but there are valid grounds for preferring it in addition
to those stated above. As noted, after the present relative success
of the first two years of law, there is the challenging failure in the
third year. This condition, and not a whim or happenstance, requires that major reforms be instituted at the end of the second
year of law work. Moreover, there are reasons beyond the circumstance that we must work with a given period of years (here
six is assumed), and that two years is a minimum for pre-law education, to support two years for the final division. Formally, of
course, two years for the final division of the 2-2-2 Plan is a necessary implication of the earlier decisions (the time remaining constant). But there is this real advantage: a substantially longer
period than two years would tend toward diffusion and waste, and
might degenerate into the mere imparting of detailed information.
Two years are long enough to accomplish the chief objectives, especially concentrated integration (for which no existing law curriculum makes adequate provision), yet short enough to require
close attention to organization and to direction of the work so as
to keep it moving toward its objectives. In two years there will
be time to impart the information necessary to understand social
theory and its significance for law, and to emphasize methods of
investigation, evaluation and use of empirical knowledge, but not
for specialization or detailed fact gathering.
Collaboration with our colleagues in the colleges under the 2-2-2
Plan would be quite different from that undertaken in the past
by law schools which have invited various scholars to participate
in the joint presentation of law courses. No doubt this method
was and is helpful, but it seems definitely on the decline, and the
reasons are not difficult to surmise. Under it the lay scholar is
compelled to do all the adapting, to accept the conditions of the
law courses; he was fitted in in a rather subservient capacity. The
2-2-2

Plan assumes equal autonomy, and imposes equal responsi-

bility. Moreover, it is not at all improbable that the joint pres-
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entation of law courses was itself premature (except perhaps in a
very few fields) because the law professor was himself struggling
to construct the theoretical lines of the integrated course- and
doing so in the presence of students and a lay colleague. But,
after all, why must the lay scholar be in the very room with the
law professor in order that law and social science be integrated?
The 2-2-2 Plan builds upon the existing division of work between
college and law school, and rests firmly on the axiom that the
training of lawyers is by no means the duty solely of the law
school. Indeed, if time is the criterion, the duty is equally that
of the college. Under present conditions the college appears to
wash its hands of the student and its obligation to him once he
enters the law school; the law school, in turn, all-too-frequently
seems to insinuate that the student's real education is just beginning. As Dean Spencer remarked twenty years ago, "A certain
feeling pervades the average university that the law school, though
it may be in the university, is not of it.""1 The 2-2-2 Plan reasserts the joint and equal obligation. It is moderate in its assumptions of available theory, personnel, materials, and organization.
It provides decent conditions for collaboration between law school
and college, and does so on a sufficiently wide scale to insure favorable results. Certainly not the least of the advantages would
be an opportunity for law teachers to inform themselves systematically in relevant fields through continuous cooperation with competent scholars in the colleges. And, moreover, this can be done
without requiring the student to bear the burden during the early
years. The Plan recognizes the various preferences of the law
professors themselves, and assumes allocation of functions accordingly.
But to some, who for years have devoted themselves to the arduous task of integrating law with social science, the 2-2-2 (or
3-2-2) Plan may seem too limited in scope. These scholars keep
before them the ultimate vision of a completely integrated and organized curriculum; they see how far we remain from the desired
results when the nonlegal disciplines are offered separately. The
writer fully agrees with this position in its theoretical import. But
construction of the best curriculum to be put into effect immedi17 Spencer, The Correlationof Law and College Subjects (1922) 5 Am. L. ScHooL
REv. 85.
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ately is also a matter of practical judgment. In the writer's opin-

ion, the

2-2-2 (3-2-2)

Plan provides the greatest opportunity pres-

ently available for building constructively on what we wish to
preserve, and, at the same time, for natural development toward
the desired ends.
No proposals for important changes in legal education may end
with any claim of perfection attained! Legal education is in a
state of accelerated change; approaches and evaluations are in
flux. Especially do we recognize the abiding contributions of
those pioneering scholars who have long pursued the difficult path
of deepening our understanding of law and legal institutions whatever methods they employ. So, too, those schools which have
introduced new courses into their curricula and revised old ones
have demonstrated that the study of law can be placed upon the
highest intellectual plane. And those few schools which have
dared to embark upon relatively new and difficult four-year curricula have placed all in their debt; they merit every encouragement.
The paths to the common goals are many and diverse; so long as
we lack detailed studies of our educational processes, we must be
tolerant of all sincerely held views, and grateful for all sound
experiment.
With final reference to the experiment suggested above, it may

be emphasized that the most difficult part of the

2-2-2

(3-2-2)

Plan - the last division - would not be put into operation until
two years after the law school's admission of students under it. In
the meantime, legal educators would have the opportunity and the
pleasure of grappling with the most vital problems of our times.
No one can predict what form the law curriculum will eventually
take, but this much is certain: the problems dealt with in creating
the new program will be as fascinating as they are difficult. They
would provide the most absorbing challenge to legal education since
Langdell.
Jerome Hall.
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